Thanks so much for this. I have added this book to my 'to buy' list! I am not so sure about the claims of the elite vs non-elite populist distinction that the author makes in the pod. I've read the recent book Elites and Democracy by Hugo Drochon, which highlights the role that elites play in all democracies, even when being led by so-called populist actors. It strikes me that Orban remained a populist, albeit migrating to international populism, by presenting himself as the protector of the Hungarian nation against pan-European elites in the EU who wanted to destroy his project and the nation. I also think his use of conspiracy theories, against Soros for example, and his regime's deliberate downplaying of Hungary's role in the holocaust, maps onto a wider populist agenda of crafting a message of Hungary vs the rest of Europe and a vision of the 'protection of the homeland'. So, even though Orban crafted his own elite structures, that to me doesn't mean he's any less populist.
The discussion also took me back to my continual discussion with Shadi on minimalist democracy. What has happened in Hungary has certainly undermined one of my core disagreements with Shadi on the potential dangers of illiberal democratic movements inside a liberal democratic structure. I did not see Orban simply accepting defeat and thought he'd try to do a Trump and at least challenge the results- perhaps the defeat was so great he thought there was no point trying to contest them.
I also find the question of 'hardball politics' an especially interesting one. It is certainly the legalisation of politics, which does exist in a different sphere from what we may call 'normal' democratic competition. I certainly think the institutional dangers of the legalisation of politics make authoritarian arrangements more likely, as it turns up the temperature of political debate and heightens the risks of failure significantly. For democracy to function effectively in the long run, heightening the risk of failure is dangerous, but then Shklar's assertion of liberal fear remains quite convincing to me.
I certainly agree with the claim that Orban was not a dictator- I agree that there was a collapse in distinctions between actual dictatorships and competitive authoritarianism. Don't get me wrong, authoritarians frequently go on to become dictators and giving them a lot of political space is dangerous, but as the guest said convincingly we cannot collapse these distinctions. This is the problems of some books, such as Tyranny of the Minority, which has this bad habit.
I don’t understand the argument some folks have been making that Orbán lost and conceded and therefore he was never so bad from liberalism and democracy perspectives. He obviously and openly tried to stack the systemic deck in favor of his party/movement and succeeded in changing Hungary’s entire electoral model in a direction designed to lock his party into permanent power, to say nothing of his attacks on civil society and independent power centers. He expressed contempt for liberal institutions at every opportunity and proudly talked about how the goal of his project was to instantiate a particular and exclusive vision of the good life as the center of public policy. He was also so sloppy and corrupt that his opponents managed to beat him, harnessing the very supermajority-producing system he designed for a permanent Fidesz lock in the process. But the fact that he lost doesn’t mean his critics were wrong about the danger he posed or the anti-liberal, anti-democratic policies he actually enacted. By his own admission he worked to rig Hungarian politics in favor of his preferred (nationalist, Christian civilizationist, personalist) outcomes.
Yeah, I think that's a good summary--and I think it might also help point out one place where I find myself disagreeing, a little bit. Julian Waller lists a dizzying array of possible categorisations for Hungary under Orban, and perhaps if you are a political scientist, they are informative. For me, though, as a member of the public, Scott Alexander's approach is more intuitive. Something is happening here that the categories in broad public usage do not really, fully capture. Details of what they are, alongside comparisons with other regimes, feel more informative than trying to get the category "right."
In Hungary specifically? The opposition leader in this case was a former Fidesz member who ran as a center right candidate against Fidesz corruption and democratic backsliding.
What the word 'corruption' means depends on who is defining it. In the USA, and I'm guessing also in Hungary (I've been there, loved Budapest), corruption is tacitly defined as "Anything those other people are doing that we don't like. Especially when it comes to spending."
I can prove beyond a doubt, based on democrat talking points, that republicans are corrupt gerrymandering criminals who are destroying the country.
I can also prove beyond a doubt, based on republican talking points, that democrats are corrupt gerrymandering criminals who are destroying the country.
Our two parties are a distinction in search of a difference. How about Hungary?
I think Scott Alexander’s piece here is very good for explaining the degrees of difference and why Orbán’s government was both more corrupt and more (though not fully) authoritarian than either the Republicans or Democrats or really any party in the U.S. or Western European context. https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/orban-was-bad-even-though-we-dont?r=5pxay&utm_medium=ios
Thanks so much for this. I have added this book to my 'to buy' list! I am not so sure about the claims of the elite vs non-elite populist distinction that the author makes in the pod. I've read the recent book Elites and Democracy by Hugo Drochon, which highlights the role that elites play in all democracies, even when being led by so-called populist actors. It strikes me that Orban remained a populist, albeit migrating to international populism, by presenting himself as the protector of the Hungarian nation against pan-European elites in the EU who wanted to destroy his project and the nation. I also think his use of conspiracy theories, against Soros for example, and his regime's deliberate downplaying of Hungary's role in the holocaust, maps onto a wider populist agenda of crafting a message of Hungary vs the rest of Europe and a vision of the 'protection of the homeland'. So, even though Orban crafted his own elite structures, that to me doesn't mean he's any less populist.
The discussion also took me back to my continual discussion with Shadi on minimalist democracy. What has happened in Hungary has certainly undermined one of my core disagreements with Shadi on the potential dangers of illiberal democratic movements inside a liberal democratic structure. I did not see Orban simply accepting defeat and thought he'd try to do a Trump and at least challenge the results- perhaps the defeat was so great he thought there was no point trying to contest them.
I also find the question of 'hardball politics' an especially interesting one. It is certainly the legalisation of politics, which does exist in a different sphere from what we may call 'normal' democratic competition. I certainly think the institutional dangers of the legalisation of politics make authoritarian arrangements more likely, as it turns up the temperature of political debate and heightens the risks of failure significantly. For democracy to function effectively in the long run, heightening the risk of failure is dangerous, but then Shklar's assertion of liberal fear remains quite convincing to me.
I certainly agree with the claim that Orban was not a dictator- I agree that there was a collapse in distinctions between actual dictatorships and competitive authoritarianism. Don't get me wrong, authoritarians frequently go on to become dictators and giving them a lot of political space is dangerous, but as the guest said convincingly we cannot collapse these distinctions. This is the problems of some books, such as Tyranny of the Minority, which has this bad habit.
I don’t understand the argument some folks have been making that Orbán lost and conceded and therefore he was never so bad from liberalism and democracy perspectives. He obviously and openly tried to stack the systemic deck in favor of his party/movement and succeeded in changing Hungary’s entire electoral model in a direction designed to lock his party into permanent power, to say nothing of his attacks on civil society and independent power centers. He expressed contempt for liberal institutions at every opportunity and proudly talked about how the goal of his project was to instantiate a particular and exclusive vision of the good life as the center of public policy. He was also so sloppy and corrupt that his opponents managed to beat him, harnessing the very supermajority-producing system he designed for a permanent Fidesz lock in the process. But the fact that he lost doesn’t mean his critics were wrong about the danger he posed or the anti-liberal, anti-democratic policies he actually enacted. By his own admission he worked to rig Hungarian politics in favor of his preferred (nationalist, Christian civilizationist, personalist) outcomes.
Yeah, I thought Scott Alexander made that point very well. "Orban Was Bad, Even Though We Don't Have A Perfect Word For His Badness": https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/orban-was-bad-even-though-we-dont
Sort of the point of this episode. Takeaway: maybe get your categories right, and stop fetishizing ones over others.
Yeah, I think that's a good summary--and I think it might also help point out one place where I find myself disagreeing, a little bit. Julian Waller lists a dizzying array of possible categorisations for Hungary under Orban, and perhaps if you are a political scientist, they are informative. For me, though, as a member of the public, Scott Alexander's approach is more intuitive. Something is happening here that the categories in broad public usage do not really, fully capture. Details of what they are, alongside comparisons with other regimes, feel more informative than trying to get the category "right."
Agreed, I thought his piece on this was very good.
I'll have to take your word for all this. I can believe it's true.
But is the other side any different? Perhaps worse?
In Hungary specifically? The opposition leader in this case was a former Fidesz member who ran as a center right candidate against Fidesz corruption and democratic backsliding.
What the word 'corruption' means depends on who is defining it. In the USA, and I'm guessing also in Hungary (I've been there, loved Budapest), corruption is tacitly defined as "Anything those other people are doing that we don't like. Especially when it comes to spending."
I can prove beyond a doubt, based on democrat talking points, that republicans are corrupt gerrymandering criminals who are destroying the country.
I can also prove beyond a doubt, based on republican talking points, that democrats are corrupt gerrymandering criminals who are destroying the country.
Our two parties are a distinction in search of a difference. How about Hungary?
I think Scott Alexander’s piece here is very good for explaining the degrees of difference and why Orbán’s government was both more corrupt and more (though not fully) authoritarian than either the Republicans or Democrats or really any party in the U.S. or Western European context. https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/orban-was-bad-even-though-we-dont?r=5pxay&utm_medium=ios