I found the discussion at the end particularly fascinating.
If I understood correctly (and maybe I'm butchering this to fit my own beliefs), I agree with the point Damir alluded to in the end about a God-based international system of values. I think the idea forces everyone to acknowledge that values are not based in some objective reality: we choose to believe in human (/animal/AI/ etc.) dignity; this doesn't follow somehow from our science or our reason. We differ on the details of this (which human lives we value more, how these measure up to animal lives or artificial consciousness, etc). A God-given system of morality forces everyone to appeal to a common, externalized, textual source (as vague as this is, given that there are many different religions and different interpretations of those religions, but we at least have some basis for argumentation). Absent that, those in power need to justify their values and not hide behind some vague idea of universal morality, which easily deteriorates into "might is right" moralizing.
I’d pushback on Santi’s idea that Paul had universal concept of humanity in Galatians 3. What made him change his mind about Gentiles was the Christ gift/event. See the work of John Barclay’s Paul and the Gift or his more popular work Paul and Power of Grace. It’s considered the greatest work in biblical studies in the past fifty years (before that was E.P. Sanders work on Judaism). Great podcast :)
Really fascinating discussion as always :) I'm still attracted to neoconservatism in some of its formation and think the problem with Bush 2 was that neoconservatism didn't play a strong enough role in it. I think given its senior players (Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice etc.) weren't neoconservatives and it was mostly second or third tier advisors at state (for instance Wolfowitz) led to a weird blend of foreign policy which satisfied no coherent foreign policy doctrine.
I still defend the idea of the Iraq war for a similar reason that you used to Santiago, on the basis that human dignity should not be up for debate. It's why I supported military intervention into the other Baathist state of Syria and why I was happy to see Gaddafi overthrown. I tend to believe our commitments in foreign policy should have gotten away from what is best for the US, leading to a pretty disastrous war on terror with unethical policies, to overt democracy promotion and clamping down on the type of authoritarianism which we wouldn't tolerate on our doorsteps.
On the point of groups inside the state challenging unjust rule, I think that's much more preferable but i tend to think inside those types of security states it's extremely unrealistic. The Saddam state was well armed, coup proofed and willing to use any force that was necessary to destroy resistance as we can see not only from their war with Iran but their actions towards the Kurdish uprising. The same was true in Syria- the mukhabarat were so omnipresent no organised resistance was really possible outside of the spontaneous uprising which occurred in Daraa. So then we're left in an uncomfortable situation where we watch suffering occur because getting our hands dirty leads to potential destabilization and even more suffering.
A similar logic to this is often offered whenever someone talks about engaging North Korea military. That no-one wants to do it- China doesn't want a US presence on their border, South korea don't want the burden of reconstruction or the possibility of being hammered with shells or even worse gas or a worst case scenario of a nuclear attack, Japan doesn't want the hassle of the balance of power shifting too much in the region, and Russia now has an additional incentive to keep the kim regime in place. All of which leads to a horrible scenario where we essentially have a Nazified state (the DPRK I believe has more in common with fascist totalitarianism than it does with soviet communism) which we reluctantly tolerate because what else can we do? Except at some point this fragile peace will inevitably break down making action when we have to take it more deadly and irresponsible arguably than if we'd have done something in the 1990's.
I think this is why I am sceptical of the idea that those regimes really do preserve peace. Such regimes are more likely to be militaristic because of their type of rule limiting the perspective of peace. We also have seen militaristic overthrows of undemocratic and totalitarian regimes such as in Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire which are now successful democratic institutions. This was done at the barrel of the gun and it succeeded. Do you think it's the case that those wars were handled terribly and hubristically but that doesn't necessarily mean democracy cannot be imposed via such methods if done differently?
When I look at Obama's track record it actually angers me more than Bush's in this area precisely because the opportunity opened up for Obama to change the game in the area but failed to do so. I know Fukuyama wrote a book explaining why he no longer considered himself a neocon because of the Iraq war but I tend to believe this was an error on his part in the end. I think the ideology still has something of worth even if some of its practitioners acted terribly.
I found the discussion at the end particularly fascinating.
If I understood correctly (and maybe I'm butchering this to fit my own beliefs), I agree with the point Damir alluded to in the end about a God-based international system of values. I think the idea forces everyone to acknowledge that values are not based in some objective reality: we choose to believe in human (/animal/AI/ etc.) dignity; this doesn't follow somehow from our science or our reason. We differ on the details of this (which human lives we value more, how these measure up to animal lives or artificial consciousness, etc). A God-given system of morality forces everyone to appeal to a common, externalized, textual source (as vague as this is, given that there are many different religions and different interpretations of those religions, but we at least have some basis for argumentation). Absent that, those in power need to justify their values and not hide behind some vague idea of universal morality, which easily deteriorates into "might is right" moralizing.
I think that's exactly right.
I’d pushback on Santi’s idea that Paul had universal concept of humanity in Galatians 3. What made him change his mind about Gentiles was the Christ gift/event. See the work of John Barclay’s Paul and the Gift or his more popular work Paul and Power of Grace. It’s considered the greatest work in biblical studies in the past fifty years (before that was E.P. Sanders work on Judaism). Great podcast :)
Really fascinating discussion as always :) I'm still attracted to neoconservatism in some of its formation and think the problem with Bush 2 was that neoconservatism didn't play a strong enough role in it. I think given its senior players (Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice etc.) weren't neoconservatives and it was mostly second or third tier advisors at state (for instance Wolfowitz) led to a weird blend of foreign policy which satisfied no coherent foreign policy doctrine.
I still defend the idea of the Iraq war for a similar reason that you used to Santiago, on the basis that human dignity should not be up for debate. It's why I supported military intervention into the other Baathist state of Syria and why I was happy to see Gaddafi overthrown. I tend to believe our commitments in foreign policy should have gotten away from what is best for the US, leading to a pretty disastrous war on terror with unethical policies, to overt democracy promotion and clamping down on the type of authoritarianism which we wouldn't tolerate on our doorsteps.
On the point of groups inside the state challenging unjust rule, I think that's much more preferable but i tend to think inside those types of security states it's extremely unrealistic. The Saddam state was well armed, coup proofed and willing to use any force that was necessary to destroy resistance as we can see not only from their war with Iran but their actions towards the Kurdish uprising. The same was true in Syria- the mukhabarat were so omnipresent no organised resistance was really possible outside of the spontaneous uprising which occurred in Daraa. So then we're left in an uncomfortable situation where we watch suffering occur because getting our hands dirty leads to potential destabilization and even more suffering.
A similar logic to this is often offered whenever someone talks about engaging North Korea military. That no-one wants to do it- China doesn't want a US presence on their border, South korea don't want the burden of reconstruction or the possibility of being hammered with shells or even worse gas or a worst case scenario of a nuclear attack, Japan doesn't want the hassle of the balance of power shifting too much in the region, and Russia now has an additional incentive to keep the kim regime in place. All of which leads to a horrible scenario where we essentially have a Nazified state (the DPRK I believe has more in common with fascist totalitarianism than it does with soviet communism) which we reluctantly tolerate because what else can we do? Except at some point this fragile peace will inevitably break down making action when we have to take it more deadly and irresponsible arguably than if we'd have done something in the 1990's.
I think this is why I am sceptical of the idea that those regimes really do preserve peace. Such regimes are more likely to be militaristic because of their type of rule limiting the perspective of peace. We also have seen militaristic overthrows of undemocratic and totalitarian regimes such as in Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire which are now successful democratic institutions. This was done at the barrel of the gun and it succeeded. Do you think it's the case that those wars were handled terribly and hubristically but that doesn't necessarily mean democracy cannot be imposed via such methods if done differently?
When I look at Obama's track record it actually angers me more than Bush's in this area precisely because the opportunity opened up for Obama to change the game in the area but failed to do so. I know Fukuyama wrote a book explaining why he no longer considered himself a neocon because of the Iraq war but I tend to believe this was an error on his part in the end. I think the ideology still has something of worth even if some of its practitioners acted terribly.
Hi Damir - could you please kindly include a link to your essay on Putin referred to toward the end of the episode? Thanks
This one: https://wisdomofcrowds.live/p/some-unpopular-thoughts-on-international?r=1qo1b&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web