This is a lovely discussion — properly adversarial without becoming overly rancorous, and very fun to read.
Damir makes a distinction between metaphysics and politics. I am wondering about how best to place this (hypothetical) distinction. We might be able to break things down, roughly, into three sets of questions:
(1) What do values consist of? What is the correct way to understand what it is to value something? What makes values meaningful, or not, on a personal or social or ultimate level?
(2) What are the correct values to have? Or, if you don’t believe this question to be meaningful, then, more narrowly, what are your values? Or, what values do you hope people will have?
(3) What power do values have, as a practical matter, in the observable world? What values do people actually hold, if any? How can human actions or observable events change the way people perceive or act on values?
Damir, I think, wants in part to stop (3) from being infected by (2) and (1). He is certainly not wrong that people’s views on (2) and (1) can sometimes distort their understanding of (3), like for example when someone expects that their values will be politically compelling because they are “correct,” and refuses to see that this may not be the case.
Sam, by contrast, thinks that we cannot fully wall these questions off from each other — and possibly that some amount of equivocation or obfuscation is the inevitable result of trying to. For example, Damir’s claim that “any positive claims to meaning are ultimately going to be private and unprovable” has serious consequences for (1). It is not just a claim about (3), no matter how much Damir might want to build that wall.
Perhaps the easiest way to make Sam’s point would be to make a plausible claim that contradicts Damir’s, but that is clearly in the realm of (1). For example, Charles Taylor makes a lovely claim in “A Secular Age” that false ideologies of value are generally compelling because they contain some truth. I call this “lovely” because, despite not sharing Taylor’s Catholicism, I share his intuition.
Taylor’s claim is clearly based on the idea that there are “true” values; it has a strong component of (1). But it is also deeply relevant to (3). It asks us to pose further questions that can be illuminating in themselves. For example, we might consider that the Nazis had a positive vision of a pure and honourable Germany, full of respectable, excellent people. This vision was central to their appeal. Taylor’s theory suggests that Nazism may have been compelling because there was genuinely something good that they were pointing at, albeit in a distorted and ultimately disastrous way.
Would it be better to exclude theories like “false but compelling ideologies generally contain some truthful value claims” from our analysis? What about the competing claim that humans are congenitally inclined to evil, even the ones we like, and that true goodness is but a rare flicker in every society known to mankind? It seems to me that political analysis would be deeply impoverished by the lack of either of these theories. But if that’s true, then we cannot simply exclude (1) and (2) from all discussion of (3).
I enjoyed this, as well, though it sent me to wikipedia a few times. I feel more drawn to Sam’s framing, but as a thought experiment, I can think of far away and long ago conflicts that now seem to be nonsensical even though it mattered immensely to the people at the time, and so I can start to envision what it might mean to look at conflict without focusing on the content. Probably because it’s almost Thanksving, I’m also thinking of those family feuds where no one can remember why it started. However, I think there are very practical reasons for wanting to seek peace and avoid violence apart from a totalizing vision of the good. War is hell and something like endless Italian vendettas or ongoing violence make regular commerce and any kind of sustainable development, or even daily living, near impossible. To reference another Shakespearean play, the feud between the Montagues and Capulets ends in tragedy and is entirely self (or family or faction)-defeating. The challenge might be one of time and timelines. One generation may be exhausted and depleted by violence, but there’s always another generation coming up. It reminds me of the poem, The People of the Other Village by Thomas Lux. https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/48485/the-people-of-the-other-village
Sorry for being so late to the party here but this was a real treat to read. I am tempted to use this discussion next semester in my classroom to highlight the difference between descriptive and normative theorising about the world. I tend to think both have their place in the world although fundamentally they answer very different questions which I think is where you and Sam stand at an impasse on some of these questions.
I think the problem for you Damir is your description of the world feels very empty. Surely even if we have a fight over values of politics it must lead somewhere? Otherwise what is the point of the fight after-all.... yes, the arc of history may not bend towards justice naturally but surely we should strive to convince others to act as if it does in the hope that it may well do.
I think Sam your problem is how can we get to these higher values when we're seemingly trapped into a system which does not and maybe cannot access these higher order values and prioritise them. We've tried systemising them and the attempt by some actors to live by them has acquired mixed results. Yes, we should act more metaphysically I think and this would create greater stakes to our politics which we likely need if we are to find justice but acting this out seems unfeasible currently. Too many actors are locked in limiting the structural conditions to make this happen.
Ultimately, it felt reading this you're both locked into different but ultimately similar conundrums which we all come across- the lack of capacity within our theories about the world. We can only explain so much and perhaps we need to treat explanations like a pick n mix. A little sprinkle here and a sprinkle there from each hypothesis could serve us well?
Politics is the process of deciding who gets what, when, and how much. Values are the ‘why’ these choices are made from/by. Even in the coldest, most antiseptic rationales there are core commitments and values; metaphysics if you will. It’s inescapable. It’s true these tensions are often resolved through/by violence, but violence doesn’t supply any meaning on its own.
If “Metaphysics, however, is still outside of the scope of things.” And violence doesn’t supply meaning, how does one make decisions in your construct?
That's up to the individual and what they want. I'm not concerned with souls. And as a result, I also put outside the bounds of analysis terms such as "evil". That's for political actors to wield as a cudgel.
That’s bleak but beyond that how do political priorities get made and enacted in your understanding? These are group, not individual value(s) judgments.
Certainly values exist within groups, and leader-entrepreneurs can leverage them to mobilize and build legitimacy for themselves. I'm in no way saying values don't exist or play a role. I'm simply saying that the content of those values is unnecessary for thinking about politics descriptively.
Rhetoric is often stronger than violence. Convincing a mob to joins you multiplies your strength, but you only have one sword arm. Politics is about mass mobilization, and that requires rhetorical communication. So it’s true that the strength of the argument matters.
Historically, of course, metaphysics has been hotly contested political terrain.
If I were to reframe Sam’s point to Damir, it would be that Damir cannot help instantiating a set of values in his actions. And he also has to stand in that despite seeming sometimes like he is assuming a position from outside of society.
That it is or isn't stronger than violence doesn't require us to ponder the moral content of the rhetoric when describing the political world. Or, rather, the content is only important politically insofar as we can wonder how well it will mobilize. And indeed, as we have seen with immigration recently, the moral argument from fellow-feeling for human beings has fallen flat on its face all across the West.
In any case, rhetoric is not always stronger. And as Machiavelli teaches, violence is not just a sledgehammer, and manipulation and coercion — also the realm of rhetoric — take many forms.
This is a lovely discussion — properly adversarial without becoming overly rancorous, and very fun to read.
Damir makes a distinction between metaphysics and politics. I am wondering about how best to place this (hypothetical) distinction. We might be able to break things down, roughly, into three sets of questions:
(1) What do values consist of? What is the correct way to understand what it is to value something? What makes values meaningful, or not, on a personal or social or ultimate level?
(2) What are the correct values to have? Or, if you don’t believe this question to be meaningful, then, more narrowly, what are your values? Or, what values do you hope people will have?
(3) What power do values have, as a practical matter, in the observable world? What values do people actually hold, if any? How can human actions or observable events change the way people perceive or act on values?
Damir, I think, wants in part to stop (3) from being infected by (2) and (1). He is certainly not wrong that people’s views on (2) and (1) can sometimes distort their understanding of (3), like for example when someone expects that their values will be politically compelling because they are “correct,” and refuses to see that this may not be the case.
Sam, by contrast, thinks that we cannot fully wall these questions off from each other — and possibly that some amount of equivocation or obfuscation is the inevitable result of trying to. For example, Damir’s claim that “any positive claims to meaning are ultimately going to be private and unprovable” has serious consequences for (1). It is not just a claim about (3), no matter how much Damir might want to build that wall.
Perhaps the easiest way to make Sam’s point would be to make a plausible claim that contradicts Damir’s, but that is clearly in the realm of (1). For example, Charles Taylor makes a lovely claim in “A Secular Age” that false ideologies of value are generally compelling because they contain some truth. I call this “lovely” because, despite not sharing Taylor’s Catholicism, I share his intuition.
Taylor’s claim is clearly based on the idea that there are “true” values; it has a strong component of (1). But it is also deeply relevant to (3). It asks us to pose further questions that can be illuminating in themselves. For example, we might consider that the Nazis had a positive vision of a pure and honourable Germany, full of respectable, excellent people. This vision was central to their appeal. Taylor’s theory suggests that Nazism may have been compelling because there was genuinely something good that they were pointing at, albeit in a distorted and ultimately disastrous way.
Would it be better to exclude theories like “false but compelling ideologies generally contain some truthful value claims” from our analysis? What about the competing claim that humans are congenitally inclined to evil, even the ones we like, and that true goodness is but a rare flicker in every society known to mankind? It seems to me that political analysis would be deeply impoverished by the lack of either of these theories. But if that’s true, then we cannot simply exclude (1) and (2) from all discussion of (3).
Thanks for hashing this out. I understand Damir’s position a more clearly now, though I resonate more with Sam’s approach.
I enjoyed this, as well, though it sent me to wikipedia a few times. I feel more drawn to Sam’s framing, but as a thought experiment, I can think of far away and long ago conflicts that now seem to be nonsensical even though it mattered immensely to the people at the time, and so I can start to envision what it might mean to look at conflict without focusing on the content. Probably because it’s almost Thanksving, I’m also thinking of those family feuds where no one can remember why it started. However, I think there are very practical reasons for wanting to seek peace and avoid violence apart from a totalizing vision of the good. War is hell and something like endless Italian vendettas or ongoing violence make regular commerce and any kind of sustainable development, or even daily living, near impossible. To reference another Shakespearean play, the feud between the Montagues and Capulets ends in tragedy and is entirely self (or family or faction)-defeating. The challenge might be one of time and timelines. One generation may be exhausted and depleted by violence, but there’s always another generation coming up. It reminds me of the poem, The People of the Other Village by Thomas Lux. https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/48485/the-people-of-the-other-village
Sorry for being so late to the party here but this was a real treat to read. I am tempted to use this discussion next semester in my classroom to highlight the difference between descriptive and normative theorising about the world. I tend to think both have their place in the world although fundamentally they answer very different questions which I think is where you and Sam stand at an impasse on some of these questions.
I think the problem for you Damir is your description of the world feels very empty. Surely even if we have a fight over values of politics it must lead somewhere? Otherwise what is the point of the fight after-all.... yes, the arc of history may not bend towards justice naturally but surely we should strive to convince others to act as if it does in the hope that it may well do.
I think Sam your problem is how can we get to these higher values when we're seemingly trapped into a system which does not and maybe cannot access these higher order values and prioritise them. We've tried systemising them and the attempt by some actors to live by them has acquired mixed results. Yes, we should act more metaphysically I think and this would create greater stakes to our politics which we likely need if we are to find justice but acting this out seems unfeasible currently. Too many actors are locked in limiting the structural conditions to make this happen.
Ultimately, it felt reading this you're both locked into different but ultimately similar conundrums which we all come across- the lack of capacity within our theories about the world. We can only explain so much and perhaps we need to treat explanations like a pick n mix. A little sprinkle here and a sprinkle there from each hypothesis could serve us well?
Politics is the process of deciding who gets what, when, and how much. Values are the ‘why’ these choices are made from/by. Even in the coldest, most antiseptic rationales there are core commitments and values; metaphysics if you will. It’s inescapable. It’s true these tensions are often resolved through/by violence, but violence doesn’t supply any meaning on its own.
Certainly never implied that violence supplies meaning.
If “Metaphysics, however, is still outside of the scope of things.” And violence doesn’t supply meaning, how does one make decisions in your construct?
That's up to the individual and what they want. I'm not concerned with souls. And as a result, I also put outside the bounds of analysis terms such as "evil". That's for political actors to wield as a cudgel.
That’s bleak but beyond that how do political priorities get made and enacted in your understanding? These are group, not individual value(s) judgments.
Certainly values exist within groups, and leader-entrepreneurs can leverage them to mobilize and build legitimacy for themselves. I'm in no way saying values don't exist or play a role. I'm simply saying that the content of those values is unnecessary for thinking about politics descriptively.
Rhetoric is often stronger than violence. Convincing a mob to joins you multiplies your strength, but you only have one sword arm. Politics is about mass mobilization, and that requires rhetorical communication. So it’s true that the strength of the argument matters.
Historically, of course, metaphysics has been hotly contested political terrain.
If I were to reframe Sam’s point to Damir, it would be that Damir cannot help instantiating a set of values in his actions. And he also has to stand in that despite seeming sometimes like he is assuming a position from outside of society.
That it is or isn't stronger than violence doesn't require us to ponder the moral content of the rhetoric when describing the political world. Or, rather, the content is only important politically insofar as we can wonder how well it will mobilize. And indeed, as we have seen with immigration recently, the moral argument from fellow-feeling for human beings has fallen flat on its face all across the West.
In any case, rhetoric is not always stronger. And as Machiavelli teaches, violence is not just a sledgehammer, and manipulation and coercion — also the realm of rhetoric — take many forms.
Yes, I agree.